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CAN HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY BE GUIDED BY BASIC
VALUES?: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF PERFECTIONIST
SOLIDARITY
R. George Wright*

I. INTRODUCTION
Debate over American health care law and policy occupies much of
our public agenda. In its most responsible forms, this debate
acknowledges important value conflicts that cannot be casually
dismissed.1 The importance of these value conflicts should move us to
think not only of moderate policy changes,2 but of the role of basic
values and principles3 in formulating and justifying health care policy.
This Article considers some of the most plausible of such basic values,4
with an eventual turn toward what we refer to as perfectionist
solidarity.5 This focus on perfectionist solidarity is intended to
encourage greater coherence in our unavoidably complex6 debates over
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
1. Thus we might wish, for example, to allocate health care in response to medical need. See
Bernard A.O. Williams, The Idea of Equality, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 116, 126 (Hugo A. Bedau ed.,
1971); Michael Walzer, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 88 (1983). On
any reasonable understanding of “need,” however, the scope of medical need must then confront the
problem of scarcity of resources. See David Braybrooke, MEETING NEEDS 295 (1987).
2. For a classic presentation, see Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959). More elaborately, see DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A
STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 81-99 (1965). For a recent
assessment, see Jonathan Bendor, Incrementalism: Dead Yet Flourishing, 75 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 194
(2015).
3. For a broad skepticism as to the role of general moral principles, see JONATHAN DANCY,
ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES (2004). But see Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics:
Generalism as a Regulative Ideal (2006). For discussion in legal contexts, see R. George Wright,
Dreams and Formulas: The Roles of Particularism and Principlism in the Law, 37 Hofstra L. Rev. 195
(2008).
4. See infra Section II.
5. See infra Section III.
6. Inevitably, health care law and policy will be complex along a number of dimensions, even
before we undertake the typically daunting tasks of empirical investigation. Consider the observations
of the widely-respected economist Amartya Sen:
[H]ealth equity has many aspects, and is best seen as a multidimensional concept. It
includes concerns about achievement of health and the capability to achieve good health
care. But it also includes the fairness of processes and thus must attach importance to
non-discrimination in the delivery of health care. Furthermore, an adequate engagement
with health equity also requires that the considerations of health be integrated with
broader issues of social justice and overall equity, paying adequate attention to the
versatility of resources and the diverse reach and impact of different social arrangements.
Amartya Sen, Why Health Equity?, 11 HEALTH ECONOMICS 659, 665 (2002). For more detailed
discussion, see Emily A. Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (And Call to Action) For the Elimination
of Health Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 275 (2015).
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health care law and policy.
Any discussion of basic health law and policy values and principles
will unavoidably involve a high level of abstraction. Abstract
discussion, however, should ultimately be responsive to real and stable
motivations and to concretely lived experience. It is of course
impossible to survey herein the full range of the effects of health care
law and policy at the level of lived experience. Merely for purposes of
introducing broader themes, though, let us immediately consider two
ordinary judicial cases implicating matters of basic values and
principles.
Consider first the case of Abigail Alliance For Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach.7 Abigail Alliance was decided at
a constitutional level,8 but the case is essentially one of appropriate
interest balancing in the health care context. The plaintiffs in Abigail
Alliance sought, on behalf of terminally ill patients, less restricted access
to experimental drugs that had passed certain safety tests, but had not
yet been established as safe and effective.9 The plaintiffs alleged that
the typical length of the full cycle of tests for safety and effectiveness
was nearly seven years.10 On this basis, the plaintiffs objected to the
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) interest balancing, or riskbenefit calculus, in cases of terminally ill patients with no alternative
treatment options.11
In response, the FDA noted the inevitable tensions among the
relevant interests,12 including the conflict between early availability of a
sole potentially viable treatment13 and the broader need to obtain reliable
data on the safety and effectiveness of experimental drugs.14 Even in
some cases of terminally ill patients, the risk of severe drug toxicity and
its effect on the quality of the patient’s remaining life was accorded
some weight.15 The Abigail Alliance court found no constitutionally
fundamental right to be at stake,16 and upheld the FDA’s particular
interest balancing process under minimum scrutiny.17 The court
concluded that “the FDA’s policy of limiting access to investigational
7. 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). For discussion, see 121 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (2008).
8. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 711-12.
9. See id. at 697.
10. See id. at 698. Expedited access for terminally ill patients was, however, available in some
cases. See id. at 698-99.
11. See id. at 699.
12. See id. at 700.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 711.
17. See id. at 713.
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drugs is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting
patients, including the terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with
unknown therapeutic effects.”18
The FDA policy in this case was sensible on certain reasonable
assumptions. Yet we can also imagine a substantial class of terminally
ill patients, with minimal life expectancies and no alternative therapeutic
options, who are willing to trade some risk of adverse side effects or of
reduced quality of life for some chance of an effective treatment. Such
choices admittedly might well slow the process of meaningful data
collection on the treatment in question.
In these cases, the most defensible approach at the level of
fundamentals must recognize the rights and interests at stake; assess
their rank, priority, or weight; and then bring them into some sort of
accommodation. Any such fundamental approach must address the
unavoidable scarcities, conflicts, and tradeoffs by reference to what is
thought to be the most important underlying basic values at stake in such
cases.
Abigail Alliance implicates at least some of the basic values at stake
in a wide range of health law and policy cases, as does, in turn, the
unrelated Medicaid assistance case of S.L. v. Division of Medical
Assistance and Health Services.19 In S.L., the 95 year-old appellant
spent several months in a care center before exhausting her financial
assets available to pay for such care,20 at which point she applied for
Medicaid benefits to cover the cost of her continuing care.21 The
agency, in response, imposed a five month eligibility penalty22 in light
of S.L.’s gifts to her children, totaling $40,000, within the preceding two
to three year period.23
Under the applicable Medicaid eligibility section,24 there is a
rebuttable presumption that “any assets disposed of by an
institutionalized individual for less than fair market value during a
period of sixty months before applying for Medicaid assistance is done
to establish Medicaid eligibility.”25 The S.L. court found that this

18. See id. For broad theoretical background, see Eric Posner & Matthew D. Adler, Re-Thinking
L.J.
165
(1999),
Cost-Benefit
Analysis,
109
YALE
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir
=1&article=2755&context=journal_articles.
19. 2014 WL 4289003 (N.J. App. Div. Sept. 2, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion).
20. See id., slip op. at 1.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i).
25. S.L., slip op. at 1.
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presumption, triggering the eligibility delay, was unrebutted.26
The court displayed a certain ambivalence in reaching this
conclusion. The court noted in particular that Medicaid eligibility in this
context is not available to any individual with countable assets or
designated kinds of financial resources in excess of $2,000.27 Given the
broader context of a large aging baby boomer cohort,28 medical
advancements,29 and technological innovation,30 the very meaning of
“elderly” was said to be in the process of redefinition.31 The court
understandably concluded with an appeal for a legislative response:
“Our legislature should seriously consider whether it is truly in the best
interests of a just society to penalize a parent for trying to give her
children a small part of the resources she and her husband accumulated
over a lifetime of work.”32
On the one hand, there is a natural sense that a 95-year old33 Medicaid
applicant may typically have been much more fortunate, with respect to
an ordinary life expectancy, than most of her birth cohort, whatever her
current newly developed physical limitations. On the other hand, she
may have paid more than her proverbial dues with respect to the
financing of the health care system over a productive working life.
Of course, it is also sensible to argue that when more or less “affluent
individuals use Medicaid qualifying trusts and similar ‘techniques’ to
quality for the program, they are diverting scarce federal and state
resources from low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and poor
women and children.”34 It is possible for persons with substantial
financial assets to game the Medicaid eligibility system, at the expense
of the less well-off.35 But it is also possible that such persons face
substantial strategic costs in other respects.36 Strategic eligibility
planning options in this context may even involve a “possible loss of

26. See id., slip op. at 5.
27. See id. Not surprisingly, given the obvious incentives and the statutory complications, there
is an elaborate case law of approved and unapproved ways of evading the relevant asset limits. See,
e.g., Daley v. Secretary of HHS, 477 Mass. 188, 74 N.E.3d 1269 (2017) (irrevocable trust instrument).
28. See S.L., slip op. at 5.
29. See id. at 6.
30. See id.
31. See id. See also Cohen v. Commissioner, Div. of Med. Assistance, 423 Mass. 399, 402, 668
N.E.2d 769 (1996).
32. See S.L., slip op. at 6.
33. See id. at 1.
34. Daley, 74 N.E.3d at 1273-84 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72
(1985)).
35. See, e.g., the authorities cited supra note 34.
36. See Daley, 74 N.E.3d at 1276.
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autonomy, pride, and dignity.”37 In particular, Medicaid eligibility rules
often encourage the humiliating disruption of the elemental solidarity of
married persons and their intact marriage by financially incentivizing an
otherwise unappealing legal divorce.38
Merely from these two nearly randomly chosen judicial cases, we can
develop some initial sense of the most basic underlying values at stake
in health care law and policy, as well as possible conflicts and tradeoffs
among those values. Implicit within the two selected judicial cases
above are considerations of the possible roles in health care law and
policy of various ideas of equality;39 a fair opportunity to live, with
whatever quality of life, for some culturally standard or meaningful
time;40 the fairness of health policies that either act upon or else ignore
one’s pre-existing health vulnerabilities41 and the closely related
ambivalent character of the idea of insurance;42 the distinctive context of
expensive end-of-life cases;43 the virtues and vices associated with
personal dependence44 and with Stoicism and related schools of
thought;45 and the crucial roles of solidarity and some not particularly
controversial forms of perfectionism.46 The attempt to recognize and
properly accommodate each of these health care values will lead to an
ultimate emphasis on what we may call the value of perfectionist
solidarity.47 We pursue this inventory and assessment below.
II. THE ULTIMATELY ABSTRACT IDEA OF EQUALITY IN HEALTH CARE
LAW AND POLICY
Equality, in the sense of the equal protection of the laws, is enshrined
at the federal constitutional level.48 As it happens, though, apart from

37. Id. Consider in particular the Medicaid program’s perverse incentivizing of legal divorce for
eligibility and asset-preservation purposes. For discussion, see, e.g., Rev. Amy Ziettlow, Is Divorce the
Best
Option
For
Elderly
Americans?,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(May
16,
2015),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-amy-ziettlow/is-divorce-the-best-option-for-olderamericans_b_6878658.html and note 122 infra.
38. See the authorities cited supra note 37.
39. See infra Section II.
40. See the “fair innings” argument infra note 83.
41. See infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
42. See id.
43. See infra notes 113-122 and accompanying text.
44. See infra note 95 and Section III more generally.
45. See infra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
46. See infra Section III.
47. See id. and text accompanying notes 127-140 in particular.
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, art. 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). See also, at the federal level, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954). For a recent exceptionally thoughtful attempt to articulate the basis or bases for universal
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some particular contexts,49 no federal constitutional right to the
provision of even basic health care has been recognized.50 So equality,
in a constitutional sense, currently does not meaningfully inform, guide,
or underlie current health care law and policy.
Constitutional equal protection of the laws, however, does not begin
to exhaust the potentially relevant understandings of the idea of equality.
Perhaps the most sophisticated and detailed theoretical approach to
health law and policy is that developed by Professor Norman Daniels.51
Professor Daniels elaborately develops and contextualizes John Rawls’s
broader understanding of justice as fair equality of opportunity.52
Roughly, the idea is that one’s health is typically crucial to the range and
value of one’s exercisable life-opportunities.53 On Professor Daniels’s
theory, the idea of normal functioning54 mediates between one’s health
and having fair equality of opportunity.55 Health and health care
opportunities are unjust, on Daniels’s view, when they result from “an
unjust distribution of the socially controllable determinants of
population health.”56 Thus health care justice is impossible without
attention to justice and equality in the many dimensions of life that
affect one’s real opportunities.57
Crucially, though, Professor Daniels recognizes that “the fair equality
of opportunity principle is too general and indeterminate”58 to address a
equality of persons, see JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN
EQUALITY (2017).
49. See the special custodial relationship obligation discussed in, e.g., Wideman v. Shallowford
Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 1987).
50. See id; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980); Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1034. See also
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1325, 1328 (2010) (noting the view that the federal Constitution is largely a charter of negative, as
opposed to positive, rights. As a matter of the collective good, though not of individual health care
right, universal vaccination may be required. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
51. See in particular NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY
(2008). For a more condensed treatment, see Norman Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care,
STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(rev.
ed.,
February
11,
2013),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-healthcareaccess/.
52. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 14, at 73-78 (rev. ed. 1999).
53. See, e.g., DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 51, at 140.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id. We would then need a theory of what sorts of conditions are “socially controllable.”
That theory would have to itself incorporate theories of justice in health-related policy, as well as highly
speculative projections as to the extent to which conditions could be remedied or prevented by various
kinds of expensive, currently infeasible, or highly invasive or otherwise objectionable procedures.
Feasibility also depends crucially upon adopting some chosen time frame. Many health-related
conditions are socially controllable, even over the long term, only by objectionable or apparently
disproportionately costly measures.
57. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 51, at 140.
58. Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 51, at 13.
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number of equality- and efficiency-related choices and tradeoffs. We
might generally wish, for example, to prioritize addressing the needs of
persons who are well below average in terms of health. Such an
approach might well promote equality in some sense. But we would
also have to think about whether to follow such a policy if the real
health benefits59 to the worse off in some given case were unfortunately
fleeting or quite limited by comparison with those that could be gained
by reallocating the resources in question to persons only somewhat
better off—and still perhaps below average in health—who would more
substantially benefit over a longer time from those reallocated
resources.60 In many contexts, after all, being worse off in terms of
health may tragically involve only minimal, temporary, or no
meaningful responsiveness to any particular therapy.
Health and health care inequalities as well do not typically manifest
themselves in tidy binaries. For some given therapy, the worst off
potential patients may be unresponsive; the slightly better off potential
patients may be, on the average, somewhat more responsive; and those
substantially better off—perhaps still below the health median—may
often be actually cured. Professor Daniels recognizes that we lack a
consensus as to how to address such problems, whether we add in any
realistic further complications and uncertainties or not.61 Given these
and other challenges to his theory of fair equality of health opportunity
and to any related theories, Professor Daniels seeks a procedural, rather
than a substantive, resolution.62 Lacking a consensus on the moral
ranking of any particular form of equality, “we should engage a form of
procedural justice or fair process to yield fair outcomes.”63
But the problem with seeking to bypass any substantively-based
choosing among conflicting health care policies by appealing instead to
the results of fair decision-making procedures, or to a fair decision59. The term “benefit” here does not require any actual positive improvement in one’s health, as
distinct from either avoiding, postponing, or slowing the rate of deterioration of some medical condition.
For background in the Medicare funding context, see, e.g., Federal Court Approves CMS Corrective
Statement to Enforce Jimmo Settlement, Center For Medicare Advocacy (February 16, 2017),
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/federal-court-approves-cms-corrective-statement-to-enforce-jimmosettlement/.
60. See Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 51, at 13.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. As merely one possible procedural model, consider the Oregon health care funding
priorities and funding cut-offs referred to in, e.g., Philip A. Perry & Timothy Hotze, Oregon’s
Experiments with Prioritizing Public Health Care Services, 13 AM. J. OF ETHICS, 241-247 (2011).
http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2011/04/pfor1-1104.html. For the current Oregon processes of
stakeholder and other public input and participation, see State Health Improvement Plan, OREGON.GOV,
www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/About/Pages/HealthImprovement.aspx (last visited July 21, 2017) (listing
seven revisable general substantive health priorities) (current priorities as including tobacco use, obesity,
oral health, alcohol and substance abuse, suicides, immunization, and communicable diseases).
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making process, is clear. The fairness of any particular decision-making
procedure, including voting processes, is plainly no less contestable than
are substantive political and legal questions. What is the procedurally
fairest way to elect state and federal officials?
Are voting
apportionment and reapportionment principles morally or politically
uncontroversial? Worse, many of the elements of our substantive policy
disputes have analogues, if not mirror images, in the realm of voting and
more general procedural fairness. A procedural focus such as that of
Professor Daniels thus largely re-inscribes the substantive policy debates
we had thereby hoped to bypass.
Nor, in the alternative, can we arrive at any reasonably determinate
guiding substantive principle by taking the edge off strict versions of
egalitarianism. The approach to distribution of goods and services
known as prioritarianism, for example, gives some merely unspecified
additional moral weight to the interests of persons who are deemed illcircumstanced64 in some supposedly absolute, and supposedly noncomparative or non-relative, sense.65 The prioritarian thus might be
willing to fund important surgeries for a limited number of the worst off
patients, even at the expense of not funding a greater number of less
serious surgeries for a greater number of somehow absolutely better off
persons. Thus the prioritarian is not always disposed to maximize
utility, or overall collective health-related well-being.66
But it is also true that a prioritarian might object to funding a limited
number of only minimally or modestly beneficial surgeries for the
desperate, at the expense of more genuinely beneficial surgeries for a
number of patients in non-desperate circumstances.67 The point here is

64. See, e.g., GREG BOGNAR & IWAO HIROSE, THE ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE RATIONING 119-22
(2014); Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202, 213 (1997); Michael Weber, Prioritarianism,
9 PHIL. COMPASS 756 (2014).
65. See Parfit, Equality and Priority, supra note 64, at 214. The point of trying to assess the
weight of interests in some non-comparative way is to try to more clearly distinguish prioritarianism
from stricter, more rigorous versions of egalitarianism. Whether we can really distinguish absolute and
relative or comparative aspects of a typical person’s overall health circumstances need not be pursued
here. For discussion of some aspects of a number of approaches to egalitarianism, see R. George
Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 L. & INEQUALITY 1 (2016).
66. See Parfit, Equality and Priority, supra note 64, at 213.
67. See id.; Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 51, at 13. In more extreme
terms, prioritarian theories seek to avoid what is called the “leveling down” problem of more strict
forms of egalitarianism. The leveling down problem might involve, for example, a society that can
reduce inequality of vision health not by improving the vision of those with deficient vision, but only by
impairing the vision of those who see clearly. For discussion, see e.g., BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE,
REAL WORLD 43 (2000). For some real world quandaries for the prioritarian, see Jerome Bickenbach,
Disability and Health Care Rationing, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (January 29, 2016),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disability-care-rationing at 15. For law-related background, see R.
George Wright, Persons With Disabilities and the Meaning of Constitutional Equal Protection, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 145 (1999).
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again not to critique any form of prioritarianism, but mainly to suggest
the practical indeterminacy of prioritarian approaches to health care law
and policy.
A further generally, but not strictly, egalitarian approach to health
care law and policy encompasses a number of variants under the
heading of sufficientarianism.68 Sufficientarian approaches to health
care are built on the belief that neither equality nor a reasonably close
approach to equality in health care need be sought. What is thought to
be crucial, instead, is that persons receive what is somehow thought to
be enough health care, or decent health care, or sufficient health care.69
Sufficientarianism, like prioritarianism,70 seeks to distinguish
supposedly “absolute” elements of health and health care from
comparative or relative considerations.71 We can certainly see the
appeal of a system in which everyone receives at least some baseline
level of health care, at least as opposed to a system in which everyone
receives equal health care, but only at a level well below any meaningful
baseline.72
But again, unavoidable indeterminacies and complications aside,
health care sufficientarianism would, with certainty, prefer to move a
very limited number of persons from the category of just barely below
sufficient care into the lowest ranks of sufficiency of care where no one
would, we assume, thereby be moved from sufficiency to insufficiency.
The problem, though, is that pure sufficientarianism would also insist on
this minimal upgrade into bare sufficiency even where a large number of
persons already below the sufficiency baseline would as a consequence
suffer a significant decline in their health care, such that they would then
be notably even further away from the baseline level of sufficiency.73
68. For some general underlying theory, see GEORGE SHER, EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS vii
(2014); Harry Frankfurt, The Moral Irrelevance of Equality, 14 PUB. AFF. Q. 87, 91 (2000); Harry
Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21, 21 (1987). At book length, see Harry Frankfurt, ON
INEQUALITY (2015). See also Kees Schuyt, The Sharing of Risks and the Risks of Sharing: Solidarity
and Social Justice in the Welfare State, 1 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 297, 298 (1998).
69. See the sources cited supra note 68. It is possible that Professor Paul Starr’s approach might
count as an example of a form of sufficientarianism. See PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE
PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER HEALTH CARE REFORM 242 (rev. ed. 2013) (referring to
cosmetic surgery, private hospital room access, and moral hazard problems as possible limits on equality
of provision).
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. See Sher, supra note 68, at viii; Frankfurt, The Moral Irrelevance of Equality, supra note 68,
at 91. Again, a distinction between absolute and relative well-being is often contestable.
72. This point reinforces not only the ‘leveling down’ problem of many forms of egalitarianism,
see supra note 67, but also suggests the values of technological and genuine economic growth,
meaningful progress, and some forms of perfectionism. See infra Section III.
73. For background, see Paula Casal, Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough, 117 ETHICS 296, 298
(2007); Liam Shields, The Prospects of Sufficientarianism, 24 UTILITAS 101, 101 (2012). Of course, we
can imagine variations of pure sufficientarianism, or combinations of sufficientarianism with other
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No focus on moving persons from bare insufficiency to bare sufficiency
can afford to ignore substantial costs to other persons below the
sufficiency level who may be made worse off by some particular policy.
The point of raising such unattractive possibilities is again not to
establish that sufficientarianism, like prioritarianism and strict
egalitarianism, definitely gives us wrong answers in some cases. The
point is rather that even before we consider questions of motivation,
sufficientarianism’s indeterminacies can be resolved only arbitrarily, or
through some contestable intuition, or by some other specification with
no obvious capacity for generating a distinctive consensus in its favor.
There are no obvious lines, descriptive or normative, among minimal
care; care that is barely below sufficiency; bare sufficiency; necessary
care; decency of care;74 and care that is appropriate for various levels of
an advanced, reasonably high-productivity economy.75
Given the indeterminacies of these varieties of egalitarianism, it is
tempting to try to bypass some of the complications by adopting some
version of what is referred to as “luck egalitarianism.”76 Roughly, the
idea of luck egalitarianism is that there are some conditions and
outcomes for which it is reasonable to hold the “actor” in question fully
or partially responsible.77 And in contrast, there are also thought to be
other conditions and outcomes for which it would not be reasonable to
hold the “actor” responsible.78 Thus being born with an exceptionally
approaches to equality or other values that would accommodate this particular concern. Even if some
such subtle hybrid could be popularized, however, the basic problem of its abstractness, and its limited
motivational power by comparison with the bonds of genuine solidarity, would remain. Persons can be
precisely equal in some relevant respect, yet mutually utterly indifferent. See infra Section III.
74. See Stephen Nathanson, Equality, Sufficiency, Decency: Three Criteria of Economic Justice,
30 PHIL. RESEARCH 367 (2005). The practicality of attempts to distinguish between health care access
that is described as basic, decent, or equitable and some more expansive provision of health care is
questioned in TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 271-74
(7th ed., 2013). The logic of continuous expansionism in health care reflects not just economic growth,
technological change, economics of scale, and age demographics, but the interest group public choice
dynamic explored in MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF CHOICE (1965).
75. For discussion of some indeterminacies of the idea of a minimum of health care, along with
adequacy in health care, necessary health care, and equality, see Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care
Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1451 (1994).
76. For background, see RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF EQUALITY 73-83 (2000); KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, LUCK EGALITARIANISM (2016); SHLOMI
SEGALL, HEALTH, LUCK, AND JUSTICE (2010). See also Shlomi Segall, Is Health (Really) Special?:
Health Policy Between Rawlsian and Luck Egalitarian Justice, 27 J. APPLIED PHIL. 344 (2010); Shlomi
Segall, In Solidarity With the Imprudent: A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism, 33 SOCIAL THEORY &
PRAC. 177 (2007).
77. See, e.g., Kok-Chor Tan, A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism, 105 J. PHIL. 665, 665 (2008);
Iwao Hirose, EGALITARIANISM ch. 7, at 157 (2015) (distinguishing health care system responses to the
heart disease of smokers and of non-smokers).
78. See IWAO HIROSE, EGALITARIANISM (2015). This distinction is vaguely related to the broad
insurance concept of “moral hazard.” See, for background, Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/3

10

Wright: Can Health Care Law and Policy Be Guided By Basic Values?: The Cr

2018]

THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF PERFECTIONIST SOLIDARITY

981

expensive medical condition is not said to be the responsibility of that
person. Such a condition was never in any sense chosen by, attributable
to, caused by, or the fault of that person. In that sense, the adverse
health condition is morally arbitrary, as opposed to being somehow
deserved.
On the other hand, someone who had entirely run a particular risk
freely and knowingly in hope of obtaining some benefit is typically
thought, despite the role of luck involved,79 to be relevantly responsible
for the undesired outcome of that free choice. Given these assumptions,
luck egalitarianism tends to hold the first person, with the unchosen
illness, to be a better candidate for publicly funded medical assistance or
other compensation than the second, assumedly freely risk-running
person.80
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 237 (1996) (“[t]o what extent are those who suffer responsible for their
condition?”). But more precisely, ‘“moral hazard’ refers to the tendency for insurance against loss to
reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of the loss.” Id. at 239. Classically, see Kenneth J.
Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
More broadly, “it seems not psychologically extraordinary for people’s sense of obligation toward
others to be reduced when they can count on institutions to take care of these obligations.” LippertRasmussen, supra note 76, at 224.
79. For this basic distinction between “brute luck” and “option luck,” see Dworkin, supra note
76, at 73-83.
80. It is possible for a luck egalitarian to avoid apparently harsh practical implications in the case
of a person who knowingly and freely ran either a low or a high probability risk, perhaps as in skiing or
mountain climbing, and is now in need of expensive long-term medical care. A luck egalitarian could
concede that justice itself does not require public payment of such expenses, but that other values and
virtues, perhaps including compassion, empathy, or, as we emphasize, solidarity, may operate to
mitigate the harshness of an undiluted luck egalitarianism. For discussion, see Segall, Is Health (Really)
Special?, supra note 76, at § 4. Otherwise, “it might be that tragically, there is a trade-off between
implementing luck egalitarian justice and promoting communal motivations.” Lippert-Rasmussen,
supra note 76, at 225-26.
The emphasis in luck egalitarianism on genuine freedom of choice may suggest that the
crucial guiding principle for a health care system should actually be individual freedom. There is a
substantial contemporary literature analyzing and critiquing the idea of individual freedom. See, e.g.,
CHRISTIAN BAY, THE STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1970); ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY:
INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy 2d ed., 2002) (classically seeking to
distinguish “negative” from “positive’” freedom); IAN CARTER, A MEASURE OF FREEDOM (2004);
RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS OF FREEDOM (1987); CHARLES FRIED,
MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT (2007); MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF
FREEDOM (2008); KRISTJAN KRISTJANSSON, SOCIAL FREEDOM: THE RESPONSIBILITY VIEW (2007);
FELIX OPPEHEIM, DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM: AN ANALYSIS (1961); CHRISTINE SWANTON, FREEDOM:
A COHERENCE THEORY (1992); GLENN TINDER, LIBERTY: RETHINKING AN IMPERILED IDEAL (2007).
The literature ultimately implies, however that individual freedom is unsuitable as a
fundamental guiding principle for health law and policy. Individual freedom instead has its place as a
typically secondary consideration in health care policy. Freedom as the absence of social restraint on
choice might be maximized in having available a variety of voluntary health insurance and health care
markets. Such markets would presumably be diversely supplemented by voluntary gifts and other forms
of charity, individual or group-based.
The default practice, though, on which free buyers and free sellers are likely to agree, would
likely involve the segmentation of relatively low cost policies for those whose profiles predict good
health, and either high cost or no meaningful insurance policies for persons likely, through no fault of
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In this context, the deepest and most important source of
indeterminacy for our purposes is the absence of anything like a
consensus on the meaning, status, value, and role of responsibility in the
relevant sense.81 But even if we set aside the most fundamental
disputes, the indeterminacies of luck egalitarian approaches are still
pervasive. Consider, for example, the context of diseases related to
tobacco use. Genetic predispositions aside, should we say that the
typical long-term smoker has more or less freely and knowingly
incurred at least some substantial responsibility for a commonly
resulting disease? Would such an assessment have been the same a
hundred years previously?
Could we not crucially complicate matters by then considering issues
of addictiveness, along with the largely unchosen environmental effects
of basic socio-economic class status? Some persons may have only
their own, to require continuing or other high-cost care. Broad health insurance risk-pooling, even
where it occurs on this understanding of individual freedom, would typically reflect something like
voluntary charity, ignorance, or high costs of predicting future health status. This simple model of
individual transactional freedom would then be complicated by variations in the degrees to which
persons plan for or discount their own future needs.
Individual freedom with respect to health care law and policy would thus seem, for example,
to largely consign persons with expensive birth defects and those in obvious need of long-term care to
prohibitively expensive or limited policies or to the contingencies of private individual or group charity.
Any persons who are unable to attract such voluntary charity would presumably be out of luck. And
such charity notoriously suffers from problems of coordination, collective action, and free-riding. See
ALLEN BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 71-74 (1988).
There will, however, be some health care contexts in which individual freedom may assume
a more important role, as in many cases inviting the availability of euthanasia or assisted suicide. See,
e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, R.G. FREY, AND SISSELA BOK, EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE (1998);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
It is, however, also possible to re-conceive of the idea of individual freedom in a more
“positive” sense. In this positive sense, freedom is largely a matter not of subjective personal choice
among options, but of genuine development, self-realization, flourishing, or fulfilling one’s potential.
See Berlin, supra, at 166.
It is clearer in this positive sense that, for example, persons with serious but potentially
remediable mobility limitations are typically, but not invariably, less than fully free. Lack of
opportunity to develop mobility potential must, certainly, be somehow weighed against the costs, in
terms of their own self-realization, of other persons who might be legally required to pay for treatment
and accommodations for persons in this limited mobility category.
More crucially, though, freedom in a “positive” or developmental sense can be largely
reduced to the value of flourishing or self-realization itself, without any further reference to any
conception of freedom. Individual and collective self-realization or flourishing can be explored and
valued on their own terms. The idea of freedom really adds nothing further of substance. And as it
turns out, individual and collective self-realization or development over time is central to our discussion
below perfectionist solidarity as a basic value or guiding principle for health care law and policy. See
infra Section III.
81. For a sense of the range of approaches to the idea of responsibility, or the lack thereof, for
one’s behaviors, see JOHN MARTIN FISHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A
THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1998); DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001);
SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION (2000); MATTHEW TALBERT, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY:
AN INTRODUCTION (2016); BRUCE N. WALLER, AGAINST MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2011).
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modestly greater realistic choice with regard to their basic economic or
class environment than with their genetic makeup, or any interaction
between their genes and environment. Could not members of distinctly
different classes often have different degrees of relevant knowledge and
freedom of choice with respect to smoking or continuing to smoke, and
thus different degrees of responsibility? But if so, how are any such
differences to be measured, and then, even more controversially,
differentially addressed by the health care system?
One might seek recourse here to the idea of personal “effort.” The
idea would be that effort, in the sense of repeatedly attempting to quit
smoking at some meaningful time, should to some degree diminish
one’s personal responsibility for reasonably foreseeable medical
consequences. On the other hand, exerting modest or no effort to quit
smoking might tend to enhance or confirm one’s responsibility for such
medical consequences. But the idea of a capacity to make an ‘effort’ is
itself mired in the indeterminacies of responsibility and is therefore of
little use in establishing the practicality of luck egalitarianism.82
Ultimately, though, the crucial problem is that inequality, in itself, is
typically not emotionally experienced with any sustained fervency and
thus does not typically meaningfully motivate potentially self-sacrificial
action. In none of its conflicting forms does the idea of equality
sufficiently motivate sustained practical commitment to any reasonably
determinate value or principle capable of meaningfully guiding
fundamental health care law and policy.83 Let us therefore turn to the
82. Compare, e.g., Nicholas Barry, Reassessing Luck Egalitarianism, 70 J. POLITICS 136, 140
(2008) (personal effort or ambition as actually largely attributable to external influences) with THOMAS
NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 118 (1991) (with some exceptions, “the level of someone’s effort is
the result of free choice”).
83. Another variant on the idea of equality is that of the so-called “fair innings” argument. For
background, see, e.g., Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: The ‘Fair Innings’ Argument, 6
HEALTH ECONOMICS 117 (1997). On Williams’ view, everyone is more or less entitled to some qualityadjusted normal span of years—perhaps the proverbial three score and ten. Thus surviving from age 80
to 85 is of less moral significance than surviving as a child, or than surviving from age 20 to 25. The
egalitarian implication is that medical resources should, all else equal, be shifted from the elderly toward
the relatively young, presumably with serious ailments. The idea is roughly that the death from illness
of a young person is a tragedy, or a loss of potential, in a way that the death of an elderly person, all else
equal, cannot match. On its own terms, the “fair innings” approach typically does not account for
degrees of chronic or long-term pain and suffering; or for differences in amenability to meaningful
treatment; or for any differences in health life-styles and behavioral risk factors, including smoking,
drinking, and obesity. See, e.g., Neil Mehta & Mikko Myrskyla, The Population Health Benefits of a
Healthy Lifestyle: Life Expectancy Increased and Onset of Disability Delayed, HEALTHAFFAIRS.ORG
(Aug. 2017), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2017/07/17hlthaff.. For commentary and
critique, see, e.g., Bognar & Hirose, supra note 64, at 91-94; Erik Nord, Concerns For the Worse Off:
Fair Innings Versus Severity, 60 SOCIAL SCIENCES & MEDICINE 257 (2005),
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii; Michael M. Rivlin, Why the Fair Innings Argument Is Not
Persuasive,
BMC
MEDICAL
ETHICS
(December
21,
2000),
http://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6939-1-1; Amartya Sen, Why Health
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alternative approach of emphasizing the typically more intrinsically or
fully emotionally infused, and thus potentially motivating, value of
solidarity as a fundamental guide to issues of health care law and policy.
III. THE IDEA OF SOLIDARITY AS A BROADLY APPLICABLE AND
SUBSTANTIALLY MOTIVATING VALUE OF HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY
One approach to understanding the potential guiding role of solidarity
in health care law and policy is to begin with the idea of solidarity in
only a minimal sense. Specifically, consider the idea of actuarial
fairness in insurance, and of narrowness and breadth in insurance risk
pooling. The basic question in this regard is whether, or in which cases,
it is legitimate to distribute the risks of illness by compelling persons to
somehow share such risks, even when some persons would prefer some
other approach.84 Out of sheer self-interest, persons who think of
themselves as healthy, now and for some relevant time in the future,
might well prefer an actuarialist approach in which their presumably
minimal health risks are shared only with a pool of very similarly
situated healthy persons, resulting in, for them, relatively low insurance
premiums.85 Whether they could self-interestedly prefer this narrow
pooling over a full lifetime, including old age, is of course subject to
greater doubt.
Thus while health insurance and other forms of insurance require
some degree of risk pooling or risk mutualization,86 the degree of
pooling or mutualization may vary from quite minimal to quite
expansive and broadly inclusive. In terms of the idea of solidarity, we
might formulate the two main alternatives as, first, a more or less
narrowly limited “chance” solidarity,87 and more expansive and
inclusive “subsidizing” solidarity.88
Equity?, 11 HEALTH ECONOMICS 659 (2002) (noting typically observed differences in overall life
expectancies as between men and women).
84. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 3 (1986).
85. See Xavier Landes, How Fair Is Actuarial Fairness?, 128 J. BUS. ETHICS 519, 519 (2015);
Jan Abel Olsen, Concepts of Equity and Fairness in Health Care, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS ch. 34, at 820 (Sherry Glied & Peter C. Smith eds., 2013).
86. See Christian Thimann, What Is Insurance and How Does It Differ From General Finance?,
THE ECONOMICS, REGULATION, AND SYSTEMIC RISK OF INSURANCE MARKETS 5, 6 (Felix Hufeld et al.,
eds., 2017).
87. See Turo-Kimmo Lehtonen & Jyri Liukko, The Forms and Limits of Insurance Liability, 103
J. BUS. ETHICS 33, 33 (2011).
88. See id. See also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION 89-90 (2007)
(usefully distinguishing forms of insurance that merely “mimic” real solidarity and those forms
embodying and expressing more intensive solidarity); DEBORAH STONE, BEYOND MORAL HAZARD:
INSURANCE AND MORAL OPPORTUNITY, IN EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE
AND RESPONSIBILITY ch. 3, at 53 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/3

14

Wright: Can Health Care Law and Policy Be Guided By Basic Values?: The Cr

2018]

THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF PERFECTIONIST SOLIDARITY

985

A relatively pure actuarial approach to health insurance thus involves
solidarity, if at all, in only the most attenuated sense.89 Limited, or nonsubsidizing, insurance solidarity requires no renunciation of personal
selfishness, egoism, or self-seeking.90 Limited insurance “solidarity”
thus correspondingly requires no empathy, bonding, meaningful group
identity, or even shared values.91
One might well conclude that this sort of minimal, non-subsidizing
solidarity is thus no solidarity at all, in the normal sense of the word.
Contemporary health insurance models in the United States vary in their
degree of embodied solidarity. In general, mainstream Republican
approaches tend to allow for the narrowing or homogenization of risk
pools,92 such that currently healthy persons can self-segregate into less
costly, perhaps high-deductible policies with limited benefits.93
Mainstream Democratic approaches, whether single-payer or otherwise,
tend to promote more inclusive, broadly subsidizing risk pools,94 where
the premiums for currently95 healthy individuals offset the greater
current and even future health care costs of chronically ill, high risk, or
severely ill persons.96 The latter approaches thus tend to more fully
accommodate, embody, or facilitate mainstream elements of a genuine
solidarity.97
Solidarity in practice thus involves a transcendence of mere
89. See Lehtonen & Liukko, supra note 87, at 36.
90. See id.
91. See id.
See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, Friendship and Solidarity, 39 RES. IN
PHENOMENOLOGY 3, 11 (200) (“[a]uthentic solidarity must be conscious”). This usage reflects the fact
that the word “solidarity” is used in a variety of senses, often thinner and less demanding than the senses
to which we refer herein. See Segal, In Solidarity With the Imprudent, supra note 76, at 195
(“[a]dmittedly, solidarity is a multiply-ambiguous term”).
92. See Drew Altman, High-Risk Pools as Fallback for High-Cost Patients Require New Rules,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FOUNDATION (January 23, 2017), www.kff.org/health-reform/perspective/highrisk-pools-as-fallback-for-high-cost-patients at 1.
93. See id. See also Linda Blumberg & John Holahan, Don’t Let the Talking Points Fool You:
It’s
All
About
the
Risk
Pool,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS
(March
15,
2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160315.053952/full/.
94. See id.; Tom Baker, Risk Insurance and the Construction of Responsibility, in EMBRACING
RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 33, 46 (Tom Baker & Jonathan
Simon eds., 2002).
95. Few persons, of course, will qualify as healthy, self-sufficient, and independent over an
entire life-span, which should encourage a reassessment of the merits of non-solidaristic approaches to
health insurance. For a sophisticated treatment of initial and eventual health dependence, see ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES ch. 1 (2001).
See also DAVID WIGGINS, ETHICS: TWELVE LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORALITY 247 (2006).
96. See Altman, supra note 92, at 1.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91. This is not to suggest that solidarity in a full
sense is limited to a bond or commitment between social or economic equals. There can be genuine
solidarity, for example, in war time between an officer and a private, as there can be between a local
philanthropist and her beneficiaries. For background, see Albert Weale, Equality, Social Solidarity, and
the Welfare State, 100 ETHICS 473, 477-78 (1990).
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aggregated98 individual interests.99 Meaningful solidarity “is associated
with mutual respect, personal support, and a commitment to a common
cause.”100 In particular, there is typically a sense that “[w]e are all in
this together, subject to poor health and the threat of death.”101 The
genuine solidarity theorist infers that “[w]e should mutually support
each other against these evils and travails, in part because we are part of
the same national or ethnic community, but in part because we all share
the human condition.”102
Short of completely universal solidarity across time and space,
solidarity may take the form of generosity103 toward a narrower or a
larger class of persons with whom we identify,104 without any
expectation of reciprocal generosity,105 or even gratitude, in return.106
Solidarity, in contrast with calculative self-seeking, may thus require
some substantial degree of personal sacrifice107 at the expense of even
one’s long-term self-interest.108
More positively, real solidarity involves presumably motivational

98. For background, see IWAO HIROSE, MORAL AGGREGATION 1-36 (2015).
99. See ANDREW MASON, COMMUNITY, SOLIDARITY AND BELONGING 21 (2000) (“[w]hen the
individual members of a group genuinely act together (as opposed to merely coordinate their actions in
response to each other), they have goals and perform actions which are not reducible to the goals and
actions of those individuals considered separately, even though the group does not exist independently
of its having individual members”).
100. DANIEL CALLAHAN & ANGELA WASUNNA, MEDICINE AND THE MARKET: EQUITY V.
CHOICE 113 (2006) (citation omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 113. See also Waldron, supra note 48. Note that if actual persons were to agree to be
bound by the basic health care law principles that would be adopted by risk-neutral choosers behind a
modified Rawlsian veil of ignorance, they might well settle upon a more or less solidaristic set of basic
principles. But adopting and choosing to be bound by this process would clearly reflect the
acknowledgement, on the part of currently healthy persons, of the strict moral irrelevance of their own
arbitrary current health advantages. Their willingness to do this, to their own personal financial
detriment, would often be motivated largely by principles and sentiments of solidarity.
103. See Christian Arnsperger & Yanis Varoufakis, Toward a Theory of Solidarity, 59
ERKENNTNIS 157, 171 (2003). Generally, we assume herein that genuine solidarity, and certainly the
feelings of generosity associated therewith, can in practice be motivational to an extent not typical of a
non-solidaristic preference for some form of equality. It might be thought that some persons will find
any inequality to be motivationally distasteful, or repugnant. But this sentiment likely attaches more
precisely to visible poverty or destitution than to inequality itself. We can safely bypass contested
general issues as to whether reasons in themselves can or must be motivating, and whether moral
judgments are internally or merely externally related to actual moral motivations. For background, see,
e.g., DAVID BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989) (endorsing moral
externalism); Connie S. Rosati, Moral Motivation, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed.
July 7, 2016)http://plato.stanford.edu/entires/moral-motivation.
104. See Arnsperger & Varouakis, supra note 103, at 171.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Andreas Eshete, Fraternity, 35 REV. METAPHYSICS 27, 28 (1981).
108. See id.
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“strong feelings of cooperation,”109 as well as “mutual identification.”110
Invidious comparisons of current benefactors and beneficiaries under
genuine solidarity tends to be reduced.111 In sum,
[s]olidarity, in general, is a matter of a group of people being
united or at one with regard to something (sympathies, interests,
values, etc.), having genuine concern for one another’s welfare,
respecting others as group members, trusting one another as group
members, [and] trusting one another not to intentionally undermine
or free ride on the group as a whole. . . .112
Solidarity, more than the more abstract, if not purely arithmetic, idea of
non-solidaristic equality, involves an inherently and directly emotional
bonding quality, and thus has a generally greater motivational potential.
The motivational power of genuine solidarity is tested especially
clearly, and in both directions, in cases involving chronic disability
expenses and the often substantial113 costs of medical care in the last
109. Lawrence Crocker, Equality, Solidarity, and Rawls’ Maximin, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 262, 263
(1977).
110. Id.
111. See id. For persons who sacrifice substantially as a matter of solidarity with those less well
off, such solidaristic motivation cannot possibly be reduced to the idea or emotion of gratitude. For
broader discussion of the remarkably interesting and complex nature of gratitude, see TERRANCE
MCCONNELL, GRATITUDE (1993).
112. Adam Cureton, Solidarity and Social Moral Rules, 15 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC.
691, 696 (2012). These understandings of solidarity seem stronger than the “shared responsibility” view
of solidarity endorsed in PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE
OVER HEALTH CARE REFORM 241-42 (rev. ed. 2013). Professor Starr’s understanding of solidarity
seems compatible with either equality or inequality in health care provision. See id. at 242. As the great
poet and insurance executive Wallace Stevens once pointed out, “universal insurance or insurance for all
is not the same thing as ubiquitous insurance or insurance for everything.” Wallace Stevens, Insurance
and Social Change, in COLLECTED POETRY AND PROSE 792, 792 (Library of America ed., 1997) (1947).
113. There is some evidence that end-of-life or final year of life medical spending, as distinct
from spending on chronic conditions over much of a lifetime, may actually be lower than is often
imagined. See, e.g., Eric B. French, et al., End-of-Life Medical Spending in Last Twelve Months of Life
AFF.
1211
(2017),
Is
Lower
Than
Previously
Reported,
36
HEALTH
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/36/7/1211.full; Melissa D. Aldridge & Amy S. Kelley, The Myth
Regarding the High Cost of End-of-Life Care, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2411, 2414-15 (2015),
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4638261. (“the cost of caring for individuals in their last year
of life accounts for only 13% of total annual health care spending”). But such costs remain substantial.
See, e.g., Michael Bell, Why 5% of Patients Create 50% of Health Care Costs, FORBES (July 10, 2013),
www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbell/2013/01/10 (“30% of all Medicare expenditures are attributed to the
5% of beneficiaries that die each year, with 1/3 of that cost occurring in the last month of life”). For
some complications, see Matthew A. Davis, et al., Identification of Four Unique Spending Patterns
Among Older Adults in the Last Year of Life Challenges Standard Assumptions, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1316
(2016), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/35/7/1316. In general, though, health care costs clearly
tend to increase past middle age. See, e.g., Louise Sheiner, Inter-Generational Aspects of Health Care,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 280, 280 (Sherry Glied & Peter C. Smith eds.,
2013).
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year or two of life.114 One practical complication in this context,
though, is that the various costs, and the relative benefits, of alternative
forms of medical treatment for persons near the end of their lives may
be unclear.115 So in some cases, it may correspondingly not be clear
which health care principles or policies should be endorsed by those
wishing to express solidarity with persons nearing the end of their life.
As many end of life cases illustrate, solidarity should often be to
some degree reciprocal, and realistically should be appropriately
constrained by considerations of effectiveness and by direct and
opportunity cost116 concerns. Some basic health care policy preferences
may have symbolic, gestural, or expressive meaning. But such
preferences should normally take into consideration the importance of
limiting the sheer waste of scarce resources.117 End of life care, for
114. The recipients of expensive such care may indeed tend to be relatively old, thus triggering
discussion of “fair innings” arguments, see supra note 83, but on the other hand, they certainly need not
be old or even middle-aged, in which case “fair innings” arguments may cut in the other direction.
115. See, e.g., Anne A. Scitovsky, “The High Cost of Dying”: What Do the Data Show?, 83
MILBANK Q. 825 (2005), www.ncbi.lm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PC2690284 (“[h]ospice care for terminal
cancer patients has not yet been proved conclusively to be less costly in all cases than conventional care.
Similarly, home care may be more expensive than institutional care in cases where there are no family
members available to help in the care of the patient”). Nor is it clear that we should categorize all the
expenses of an unsuccessful treatment as misguided or wasteful where there was some appropriate
uncertainty of the eventual outcome at the time of the expenditure. See id. See also T. Balboni, et al.,
Support of Cancer Patients’ Spiritual Needs and Associations with Medical Care Costs at the End of
Life, 117 CANCER 5838 (December 1, 2011),www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21563177 (reporting
higher end of life costs when patients perceived that their spiritual concerns were not being
appropriately addressed).
116. For background, see, e.g., David R. Henderson, Opportunity Cost, THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008), www.econlib.org/library/ENC/OpportunityCost.html (roughly,
opportunity cost as the forfeited value of the single most valuable foregone alternative use of the
resources in question). Too often, cost analysis focuses solely on short-term and occasionally long-term
or indirect costs, and not as well on what values are no longer attainable, in or out of the health care
area, because of the expenditures in question.
117. See, e.g., Benedict Rumbold, et al., Public Reasoning and Health-Care Priority Setting: The
Case of NICE, 27 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107, 123-24 (2017), http://muse.jhu.edu/article/652734
(citing RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 315
(2000)). Beyond the context of end of life cases, consider the observation of the economist Joseph
Stiglitz that “[i]t is not that we spend 17 percent of our GDP on health care that is the problem; it is that
we get so little for how much we spend.” Joseph E. Stiglitz, Commentary on Amy Finkelstein, in
MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE 66, 69 (2015). Waste often takes the form of ignoring or
unduly discounting not just opportunity costs, but the interests of invisible, anonymous, inconspicuous,
or merely future victims of an inefficient current policy. For a useful example, see Carroll v. Otis
Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 212, 216-17 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). For a broad
overview, see CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS chs. 1, 16 (5th ed. 2013). For a marketoriented view of the dynamics of the Medicare system, see the satiric, virtue- and vice-sensitive work by
DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006). For a classic utopian virtue-oriented
but non-market focus in considering issues of physician compensation, see EDWARD BELLAMY,
LOOKING BACKWARD 2000-1887 103-04 (Cecelia Tichi ed., 1982) (1888). Ultimately, health care
economics and the most important value tradeoffs are not entirely reducible to some combination of
mere normative preferences, confirmation bias, unexamined intentions, magic, or luck. The tradeoffs
are to some extent more inescapably built into the fabric of resource scarcity.
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example, that contributes relatively little on any sensible measure of
quality or quantity of life will often be at best poorly justified, even in
terms of overall solidarity itself. No moral person, as a general rule, is
in all respects outside the scope of both the benefits and burdens of
genuine solidarity.
This is not solely a matter of the sense that solidarity itself should not
require substantial waste, especially at the expense of other medical
patients, in other circumstances, with whom solidarity could be
expressed.118 Solidarity need not always, at any given time, involve
direct reciprocity, or concrete mutuality.119 We can act on the basis of
solidarity with future generations with whom we do not overlap. But
certainly, in many cases, any impulse toward solidarity on the part of
benefactors should evoke some appropriately solidaristic response on
the part of beneficiaries, whether the beneficiary can exercise narrowly
reciprocal solidarity at any point or not.
Thus for persons nearing the end of life, solidarity should often
involve more than the mere feeling of gratitude for expensive care. In
many cases, genuine solidarity can be more concretely expressed by,
and not simply toward, end of life patients. This form of solidarity can
be expressed toward those who subsidize one’s end of life care, toward
other current sufferers, and toward those persons, perhaps of a later
generation, who might benefit in the future by current displays of
reasonable self-restraint on the claims that might otherwise be made by
end of life patients themselves. Certainly, all persons could conceivably
ask for greater solidarity from everyone except themselves. But that
motivation, to the extent that it is merely self-seeking, is contrary to the
very essence of solidarity itself.
In many instances, the solidaristic sacrifice involved in declining
some additional health care spending by end of life patients may be
modest in its magnitude. Many such persons would prefer to end their
days at home, rather than in some less familiar institutionalized
facility.120 There may be only limited, if any, personal financial

118. See Rumbold, et al., supra note 117, at 123-24.
119. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. Persons can emotionally feel, and be
thereby motivated by, solidarity with both ancestors and future generations, where reciprocity is
realistically impossible. Consider the willingness to personally sacrifice substantially today for the sake
of preserving environmental and climate quality for future generations with whom, for one reason or
another, one identifies.
120. See, e.g., Thomas W. Feeley, The Value of ICU Care at the End of Life, NEJM CATALYST
(September 28, 2016), http://catalyst.nejm.org/value-icu-care-end-of-life; Daniela J. Lamas, et al.,
Opening the Door: The Experience of Chronic Critical Illness in a Long-Term Acute Care Hospital,
CRITICAL CARE MEDICINE (2008), www.ccmjournal.org at 361; Joan M. Teno, et al., Change in Endof-Life Care For Medicare Beneficiaries, 309 JAMA 470, 470 (February 6, 2013) (“a majority of people
would prefer to die at home if they were terminally ill”).
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sacrifice in exercising the former option.121 But any competent person,
even in end of life circumstances, may, perhaps through advance
directives, appropriately122 acknowledge the bonds of solidarity. It
would in a sense be degrading to exempt all end of life patients, for
whom social memories and broader moral aspirations may be especially
important, from any active and in a sense self-sacrificial solidarity
toward others.
Some such persons, after all, may wish at a crucially appropriate time
to emphasize particular classic virtues, such as fortitude, forbearance,
equanimity, self-control, humility, perspective, and generosity of spirit,
that reinforce a solidaristic recognition of the tradeoffs associated with
one’s own presumably especially expensive care. Such virtues have
been widely recognized, not just by the historical Stoics,123 but by preStoics124 and post-Stoics125 alike. Thus Seneca classically holds that
[a]n ordinary journey will be incomplete if you come to a stop in
the middle of it, or anywhere short of your destination, but life is
never incomplete if it is an honorable one. At whatever point you
leave, if you leave it in the right way, it is a whole.126
121. We assume for this purpose that dying with one’s family at home will often, but not always,
be less costly for the broader paying public.
122. For a typically inappropriate breach of one of the most intimate and elemental forms of
solidarity, consider the common incentivizing of more or less sham divorces for the sake of obtaining
long-term care Medicaid funding. See K. Gabriel Heiser, Medicaid Divorce: Is It a Viable Planning
www.agingcare.com/articles/medicaid-divorce-planning-optionOption?,
AGINGCARE.COM,
196512.htm (visited July 28, 2017); Rev. Amy Ziettlow, Is Divorce the Best Option for Older
Americans? HUFFINGTON POST, available at www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-amy-ziettlow/is-divorce-thebest-option (May 16, 2015) (last visited July 28, 2017). For such cases, appropriate solidarity on the
part of the broader public requires some accommodation of the most intimate and elemental forms of
solidarity, which in turn are linked to the development and fuller realization, or gradual progress toward
perfection, of the human person.
123. See, merely for example, SENECA, LETTERS FROM A STOIC, Letter LXXVII (Robin Campbell
trans., 1969) (~64); SENECA, ON THE SHORTNESS OF LIFE (C.D.N. Costa trans., 1997) (2005 ed.) (~64);
EPICTETUS, THE DISCOURSES book III, ch. 10, at 172 (Robin Hard rev. trans., 1995) (~140) (“How We
Should Bear Illness”); EPICTETUS, THE ENCHIRIDION § 2, at 18 (Thomas W. Higginson trans., 1948)
(~140); MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS book II, § 11, at 48 (Maxwell Staniforth trans., 1964)
(~167).
124. See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC book IX, § 5, at 95-96 (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans.,
1941) (~370 BCE) (the personage of Herodicus as becoming a plague to himself and others “by
lingering out his death. He had a mortal disease, and he spent all of his life at its beck and call, with no
hope of a cure and no time for anything but doctoring himself”).
125. See,
e.g.,
RALPH
WALDO
EMERSON,
SELF-RELIANCE
at
8
(1841),www.emersoncentral.com/selfreliance.htm (referring to “the mutual reverence that is due from
man
to
man”);
HENRY
DAVID
THOREAU,
CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE
at
6
(1849)http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper2/thoreau/civil.html (referring disdainfully to a lack of “cheerful
self-reliance” as distinct from a less desirable reliance on “the Mutual Insurance company”).
126. SENECA, LETTERS, supra note 123, Letter LXXVII, at 125. Note also Plato’s critique of the
apparent priorities of Herodicus, supra note 124, at 95-96. It is also worth noting that even the
apparently controversial Nietzshean injunction to “die at the right time,” taken by itself, is open to a
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None of this is to suggest, for patients with especially expensive
illnesses or for others, that the reflective pursuit of the overall value of
solidarity should always override any other value rightly invoked by any
affected party. Solidarity, as developed and understood to this point,
can of course motivate and guide optimally only when some reasonable
account of other values, virtues, and interests is taken.
An especially important development of the idea of solidarity, and a
link to a generally uncontroversial idea of “perfectionism,” emphasizes
the idea of solidarity extended over time.127 Broad solidarity over time
could, presumably, contribute to social stability, to sustainability, and to,
as we emphasize herein, cultural progress and cultural perfectionism.
But solidarity can also sometimes be “merely” expressive, rather than
medically effective in terms of substantive outcomes. By invoking the
idea of perfectionism, we intend merely to emphasize the moral
importance of genuine collective progress and development in health
care, broadly and over time. Health care systems should thus be attuned
to the possibilities and limitations of what we might thus call the
perfectionist solidarity.
It is important to recognize that perfectionist solidarity as we use the
term is not intended in the slightest to imply that progress, or overall
genuine improvement over time, should be obtained by the coercive or
uniform imposition of some officially preferred but contestable single
model of what human health, or human flourishing more broadly, should
involve.128 Nor is perfectionist solidarity at all a matter of focusing on
preferences, interests, or enhancement of some presumed elite group.129

range of interpretations. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 97 (R.J. Hollingdale
trans., 1961) (1883).
127. See, classically, Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE
EDMUND BURKE 416, 458 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999) (1790) (depicting society as a multi-generational
ongoing partnership encompassing, importantly for our purposes, “all perfection”).
128. As is recognized even by critics of perfectionism. See STEVEN LECCE, AGAINST
PERFECTIONISM: DEFENDING LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 117 (2008).
Professor Matthew Kramer in this context attempts to distinguish between a governmentinitiated perfectionism that seeks more or less directly to promote upgraded lives of the citizenry, and a
similarly government-initiated perfectionism that pursues a similar end more indirectly, through
operating first on the quality or stature of the society itself, as distinct from its members. Professor
Kramer refers to the first form as “edificatory” perfectionism, and to the second form as “aspirational”
perfectionism, with the first form being much more commonly advocated than the latter. See MATTHEW
H. KRAMER, LIBERALISM WITH EXCELLENCE 36 (2017).
Assuming that these two forms of perfectionism can be distinguished in practice, it would
seem that many perfectionists would naturally be attracted to some sort of mixture of Professor
Kramer’s above direct and indirect approaches toward perfectionism. To the extent that a choice must
be made between the two, the argument for perfectionist solidarity herein would, in focusing on basic
policy justifications for health law and policy, seem more indirect than direct. See Kramer, id. at 33-39.
129. See, e.g., STEVEN WALL, LIBERALISM, PERFECTIONISM AND RESTRAINT 19 (2006 ed.) (1998)
(distinguishing between “universal perfectionism” and “parochial perfectionism”); THOMAS HURKA,
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The idea of perfectionist solidarity does not negate the foundational
element of broad social solidarity itself.130
One form of perfectionist solidarity was historically expressed as “the
settled disposition on each man’s part to make the most and best of
humanity in his own person and in the persons of others.”131 This
conception of perfectionist solidarity thus emphasizes broad, if not
universal, development, self-realization, and flourishing.132
As
inseparable as health care law and policy is from broader measures of
well-being, it is hardly surprising that good health133 and at least some
realistic access to basic health care134 are typically crucial to human
development, flourishing, and perfection. Flourishing and gradual
cultural perfection over time through health care will thus require
genuine collective economic, scientific, and technical progress.
Solidaristic progress can unfortunately be slowed or reversed by
unwise policy choices. It is in the long run enabled and promoted by
what we might call broad genuine underlying economic progress and
development, or genuine growth.135 There can also of course be social
solidarity without any meaningful dimension of progress or social
perfection. There can be a solidarity of slow genuine growth,
stagnation, ignorance, and delusion. But there is also a solidarity of
collective achievement, of enhanced understanding, and of overcoming
barriers to the promotion of health, taking some form of what we have

PERFECTIONISM 147 (1993) (“[t]he best political act, institution, or government is that which most
promotes the perfection of all humans”).
130. See the sources cited supra note 129.
131. THOMAS HILL GREEN, PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS § 244, at 262 (Nabu reprint ed.) (3d ed.
1890).
132. See DAVID O. BRINK, PERFECTIONISM AND THE COMMON GOOD: THEMES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF T.H. GREEN 53 (2003).
133. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION 48 (2007) (“[g]ood health, like
good character, is a constitutive element of human flourishing”). It is worth noting that Professor
Sandel’s argument against a form of ‘perfection’ really opposes something like supra-human or nonhuman perfection, as distinct from our concern herein for the progressive cultural development of
humanity.
134. See Brink, supra note 132, at 48 (“[b]asic healthcare is essential not just to making possible a
decent lifespan but also to the proper development of young minds and bodies”).
135. The fact that it is apparently difficult to meaningfully address productivity growth issues by
consensual means does not mean that this problem is less than crucial. For discussion, see ROBERT J.
GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH 641-52 (2016); Neil Irwin, Why Is Productivity
Growth
So
Weak?
Three
Theories,
N.Y.
TIMES
(April
26,
2016),
www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/upshot/why-is-productivity-growth-so-weak-three-theories.html;
23
Economic Experts Weigh In: Why Is Productivity Growth So Low?, FOCUS ECONOMICS (April 20,
2017), www.focus-economics.com/blog/why-is-productivity-growth-so-low.; Jonathan Rockwell, No
Recovery:
An Analysis of Long-Term U.S. Productivity Decline, GALLUP.COM (2016),
http://news.gallup.com/reports/198776/no-recovery-analysis-long-term-productivity-decline.aspx.
Of
course, as many cases of disability and other illnesses suggest, collective health, along with health law
and policy, can affect productivity rates and in turn reciprocally be affected by those rates.
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herein called perfectionist solidarity.
To more clearly see the value of distinctively perfectionist versions of
solidarity, it is best to consider how particular areas of health care
treatment have evolved over the preceding centuries. Consider, merely
for example, the realm of prescription drug therapies for various
psychological ailments. We often sense, even today, the crude fumbling
inadequacies of even our best current efforts in this area, where the
inadequacies are largely traceable to our insufficiently developed
understanding of the relevant sciences.136 And at the same time, we
recognize incontestable progress in those respects over our prior even
more pervasive ignorance.137 MRIs are an upgrade over phrenology, or
a focus on the four bodily humors, or the application of leeches, or pregerm theory in general. Blood-typing involved recognizable progress.
Genuine solidaristic progress in health care, as in the transition from
saws to arthroscopes, is ultimately linked to human dignity.
The costs to present generations of making provision for meaningful
progress over time need not be onerous.138 Crucially, insofar as
solidarity obtains between generations, sacrifice on behalf of future
generations is actually reduced to the extent that earlier generations
freely and genuinely identify with later cohorts’ achievements. There is
appropriate pride to be taken being a “founding generation,” or in
making causally necessary savings, investment, or other contributions to
an inspiring multi-generational project.139
As well, generational
interests can reasonably be seen as to some degree blurred.
Collectively, investing at age 30 in basic science, in hopes of disease
prevention or cure, may pay off perhaps 20-40 years later, in time even
for one’s own personal medical benefit.140 In several respects, then, the
conflicts between reasonably enlightened self-interest and relatively
136. See, e.g., Sonya Vatomsky, When Medication Side Effects Make You Rethink What It Means
to Have a Good Life, THE CUT (July 28, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/article/antidepressant-sideeffects-quality-of-life.html.. More generally, see What Is Precision Medicine, US NATIONAL LIBRARY
OF MEDICINE (July 25, 2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/precisionmedicine (discussing the NIH’s
Precision Medicine Initiative). See also PRECISION HEALTH INITIATIVE, INDIANA UNIVERSITY,
https://precisonhealth.iu.edu/ (visited July 28, 2017).
137. Compare, for example, the limited therapeutic benefits of historically practiced patient
bloodletting, see Elena Conis, When Bleeding Was a Treatment, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2006),
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/26/health/he-esoterica26, with the vast potential for medical
exploitation of a fuller understanding of the human genome. See, e.g., A QUARTER CENTURY AFTER
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT’S LAUNCH: LESSONS BEYOND THE BASE PAIRS, NATIONAL HUMAN
GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December, 2015), www.genome.gov/27562713/nhgri-celebrateslaunch.
138. See, e.g., the exceptionally thoughtful account in TIM MULGAN, FUTURE PEOPLE: A
MODERATE CONSEQUENTIALIST ACCOUNT OF OUR OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 218-19
(2006).
139. See id. at 219.
140. See id.
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strong forms of perfectionist solidarity in health care law and policy
need not be discouragingly severe.
IV. CONCLUSION
We began our inquiry by considering the difficult interest balancing
involved in access to not yet fully approved prescription drugs by
terminally ill patients,141 and the conflicting interests at stake in attempts
to distribute the costs of Medicaid eligibility for the middle class elderly
in particular.142 These and related conflicts in other areas of health care
law and policy are occasionally understated in popular advocacy
rhetoric, but understatement does not abolish the underlying conflicts.
The first constructive step toward the best available underlying theory
of health care is to try to build some attention to the inevitable value
conflicts into even apparently technical inquires, including, for example,
whether a proposed treatment is “medically necessary.”143 Ultimately,
our most defensible responses to undeniable value conflicts and
tradeoffs must address such conflicts at the most basic level. We have
seen above, though, that approaches involving the general idea of
equality quickly divide into conflicting camps.144
Much more
importantly, however, the various forms of equality, separate and apart
from genuine solidarity, community, the desire for collective progress,
and similar sentiments and relationships, turn out to be rather abstract,
and in themselves not especially useful motivators of any real and
sustained inclination to freely and reasonably sacrifice for the sake of
others.145
What, then, can we summarily conclude about our two initial
exemplary cases?146 In both cases, pursuing the various ways in which
the most directly affected persons either are or are not being treated as
equals of other classes of persons leads us into multiple indeterminacies.
But far more importantly, chasing the various forms of equality leads us
into abstraction conceptions with little realistic power to sufficiently

141. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Ariana M. v. Humana Health Plan, 854 F.3d 753, 755 (5th Cir.), reh’g en banc
granted on other issues, 2017 WL 3029158 (July 10, 2017) (mem). The health care plan in Ariana M.
specified that in order to qualify as “medically necessary,” a proposed treatment must, among other
requirements, be “[n]ot more costly than an alternative service or sequence of services at least as likely
to produce equivalent therapeutic or diagnostic results as to the diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s
sickness or bodily injury.” Id. at 755. For general background see Eric Posner & Matthew D. Adler,
Re-Thinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999).
144. See supra Section II.
145. See supra Section III.
146. See supra Section I.
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motivate either the affected persons or those actors who are in a position
to affect the relevant policies.147 Perfectionist solidarity, on the other
hand, can more clearly transcend the abstractness of the contending
approaches to the idea of equality, and more sustainably motivate a
viable and otherwise defensible fundamental approach to health care law
and policy.

147. See infra Section II. As well, recall our conclusion that the value of individual freedom is in
most contexts appropriately assigned a secondary, though broadly relevant, value in typical health care
cost allocation contexts. See supra note 80.
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